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and equity. In this paper we evaluate the involvement of communities in a tradable permit
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1Introduction
The growing interest in transferable permit (TP) polices as a tool for environmental man-
agement suggests that the role of communities in such systems should be investigated fur-
ther. Traditionally, polluting rms have been regulated entities. When a TP system is
implemented, the regulator allocates pollution permits to rms based on criteria such as
historical market share. After this initial allocation, rms may buy or sell pollution permits
to each other, or to non-polluting third parties, such as environmental groups or consumers.
Communities aected by the emitted pollution consume the level of environmental quality
associated with the quantity of pollution permits used by the producers, and consume the
output produced by the polluting rms.
As currently implemented (US EPA programs [1994], OECD Guidelines [2001]), con-
sumers are involved in tradable permit programs in the following ways: 1) consumers (or
aected communities) do not have an initial allocation of rights to freely trade in the pol-
lution permit market, which determines environmental quality; 2) consumers can only buy
rights (re
ecting their demand for environmental quality); 3) As a consequence of (1) and
(2), the policy may result in income constraints for consumers, restricting their volume of
trade relative to the optimal level. The income constraint is generated by the regulator's
decision to allocate property rights to polluting rms.
Trade will be ecient if all involved parties can freely trade. Trade among rms will
lead rms that produce more eciently to buy permits from less ecient rms and produce
a larger share of output and/or to reduce the total abatement costs (Dale, [1968]). However,
merely allowing post-allocation trade among rms will not correct for any \mistakes" in
the level of pollution specied in the initial allocation. For example, if the regulator is
uninformed about communities' disutility from pollution, she may specify a pollution level
that is ecient in expectation, but not ecient ex post. Trade between polluting rms and
consumers can achieve ex post eciency provided that the rst-best level of pollution is less
than or equal to the total level of pollution permitted by the regulator, and provided that
consumers' trade is not bound by income or wealth restrictions.
We propose to incorporate both polluting rms and non-polluting agents in the initial
allocation mechanism. Using a general equilibrium framework, we reassess the importance
of the initial allocation of rights, and demonstrate that allocating initial property rights to
non-polluting agents can lead to a Pareto improvement, both in environmental quality and
in generating cost savings.
The importance of the initial allocation of rights for equity and economic eciency is
well known, although research regarding pollution rights has been done mainly in a partial
equilibrium framework, where the analysis focuses on producers alone, and ignores consumers'
actions in the related markets. Initial economic research followed Coase's approach (1960),
and assumed that the initial allocation of rights did not matter for economic eciency, if
markets are perfectly competitive and there are no income constraints and transaction costs
(Montgomery 1972).
Later research extended this approach by analysing alternative market structures.
Hahn (1984) challenged Montgomery's nding regarding the eects of the initial alloca-
tion of permits on total costs and environmental quality by introducing strategic behavior
1in the permit market. Under that market structure, the initial distribution of rights aects
economic eciency and environmental quality, as well as equity. Malueg (1990), and Fersht-
man and de-Zeeuw (1995) introduced cases in which rms' output markets are imperfectly
competitive. They demonstrate that under these conditions, and for a specied xed initial
allocation of rights among polluting rms, allowing trade in emission permits is not nec-
essarily benecial. Trade may result in a market equilibrium with lower output rates and
higher prices. These results are restricted to the case in which trade occures only among
rsm. Consumers are not taken into consideration in the trade system.
A dierent line of research (Montero, 2000) examines the eciency eects of the al-
location of rights among two categories of rms. Incorporating a voluntary opt-in clause
for otherwise unregulated rms into the TP may potentially generate a superior welfare
outcome.
In this study, we reevaluate the eect of the initial allocation of rights on the eciency
of the tradable rights policy using a more elaborated economic framework, which includes
an equilibrium analysis of multi markets. We extend the circle of traders to other parties
in addition to aected rms, by including consumers, or aected communities, rather than
other producers. Specically, we evaluate the implications of the following thought experi-
ment: what are the eciency implications of initially allocating tradable permits to aected
communities (who are also the consumers of the good produced), rather than to polluting
rms? We demonstrate that assigning communities the right to pollute (equivalently, the
right to environmental quality) can lead to a Pareto improvement in environmental quality
and welfare, relative to the traditional allocation approach.
The next sections describe the theoretical framework. We begin by dening the regula-
tor's objectives (section 1), and then evaluate the community's utility mazimization problem
in the output and pollution markets (section 2). Throughout our analysis, we assume that
the community behaves competitively. In section (3) we focus on the competitive rm's
responses to changes in the initial allocation of rights, and analyse the resulting competitive
equilibrium, from trade among producers and consumers in the rights and output markets.
In section (4) we discuss the intuition and main results derived from theoretical analysis. The
last section summarizes and discusses the implications of the proposed regulatory mechanism
on TP policy.
1. The Regulator





where Uj is the agent j utility. The regulator determines a level of pollution rights,  L, to
be allocated among J agents, who are polluting productive units and consumers (aected
communities). Let the regulator's allocation be described by a share vector , where  =
f1;2;:::;jg; and
P
j j = 1: Following the allocation of rights, communities and rms
can trade among themself the rights allocated, and the good produced. The values of the
rights and the good are freely determined in the markets. Denote by Lj the nal allocation
of rights, after trade, to agent j.
2We will primarily consider a perfectly competitive economic environment, and evaluate
the impact of the regulator's rights allocation decision on social welfare. We will show that
when considering trade among producers and consumers in both rights and output markets,
the initial allocation of rights does aect the resulting equilibrium, and that by reallocating
rights to communities we can achieve a pareto improvement.
2. The Community
The community benets from its consumption of the nal good produced by the rms
(Q) and environmental quality, which is negatively aected by pollution, Ep. Denote by
U[Q;Ep] the function representing community preferences over the two goods. It is assumed
that the partial derivatives of the utility with respect to the rst and second arguments are
U1 > 0;U2 < 0;U11  0;U22 < 0: For simplicity, assume also U12 = 0:
The community can aect air quality by reducing the level of rights held by the pro-
ductive (polluting) agents. We assume that the productive units use all of the rights that
they hold after trading. Given an initial level of rights allocated,  L, the community demand
for rights (Lc) determines air quality. The community chooses the levels of rights and good
Q that maximize utility.
(2) fQ;Lcg 2 argMax

U[Q;Ep] j
Ep =  L   Lc
tQ + p
 




where  w is the wealth of the comunity, t and p are the prices of output and rights, respectively.
 L is the level of rights allocated among J agents, c is the initial share of rights allocated
to the community and Lc is the ex-post trade level of rights hold by the community. The
rst constraint represents ex-post air quality, given the total level of rights allocated and
the nal allocation of rights among the community and the rms. The second is the budget
constraint faced by the community. The community behaves competitively in both markets
throughout our analysis.
The rst order necessary conditions for optimality imply the following:
tQ + p
 
Lc   c L





ULc = 0 (4)
for positive values of Q and Lc, which ensure that the constraints hold with equality.
The community chooses fQ;Lcg such that the marginal value of environmental quality is
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3Using Cramer's rule, we nd the eect of a change in the initial allocation on the
community demand for the two goods:
















   
< 0:
The eect of a change in price of rights on the community's ex-post level of rights de-
pends on the relationship between the quantity it wants to hold and the quantity it received.




















< 0 if Lc   c L > 0:
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3. The Competitive Equilibrium
Consider an economic environment with one community and one competitive rm. The
competitive rm maximizes prots by choosing its optimal output level Qf (e.g. electric-
ity). Emission is a byproduct of production and needs to be controlled. Dene E[Qf] to be
emission as a function of production. Two emission control tools are available to the rm:
abatement (a) or pollution rights Lf. The emission generated can be abated at an increasing
cost G[a], or emitted. The rm can emit ( pollute ) only if it holds an equivalent amount of
pollution rights, Lf. Rights can be traded in a competitive market1. Let Ls be the quantity
of rights supplied by the rm, and thus Ls = f  L   Lf:
1Clearly, the assumption of a single competitive rm is questionable if interpreted literally. The single
rm may be interpreted as the aggregate of J  1 identical rms. The J  1 rm analysis would generate the
same results, provided rms were allowed to trade freely among themselves, as well as with the community.
4The rm's prot function is dened as
(9) 
1
f[Qf;Lf]  tQf   C[Qf]   G[a]   p
 
Lf   f  L

where t and p are the prices of output and rights, accordingly. Qf is the level of production;
C[Qf] are the production costs, assuming C0[Q]  0;C00[Q]  0 ; G[a] are abatement costs,
assuming G0[a] > 0;G00[a] > 0 ; Lf is the quantity of rights to be used by the rm; and f
is the share of rights initially allocated to the rm. Since all pollution must be abated or
associated with a pollution right,
a = E[Qf]   Lf:
Given the properties above, the prot function is concave in Qf and Lf. The rst order




0[Qf] = 0 (10)
G
0[a]   p = 0 (11)
Equations (10) and (11) indicate that the competitive rm's decisions for production
and pollution control are independent of the initial allocation on rights when the rm is a
price taker (Montgomerey, 1972). Thus trade among rms only will be independent of the
initial allocation of rights. However, this conclusion does not hold when both communities
and rms can trade in rights. By total dierentiating the rm's rst order condition we
obtain

 C00[Qf]   G00[a]  (E0)
2 G00[a]  E0
















The rm's response to a change in output and rights prices is derived using Cramer's
rule:
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5Proposition 1 summarizes the impact of the initial allocation of rights in a general equi-
librium framework, where the equilibrium is determined by equalizing community demand
and rm supply in each market.
Proposition 1. Suppose that W() is a continuous welfare function representing the rm
and community preferences, and M1 = fp1;t1;L1;Q1g is the market equilibrium in perfectly
competitive rights and output markets. Then, an increase in the initial share of rights to
the community will result in a new equilibrium, M10 = fp10;t10;L10;Q10g, that possesses the
following properties relative to equilibrium M1:
(1) The volume of rights traded is lower, and the value of rights is lower.
(2) The ex-post level of rights used by the rm is lower.
(3) Environmental quality is higher.
(4) The level of output produced and its price increases.
(5) Welfare under the new equilibrium is higher.
Proof in the appendix. Figure 1 presents the general equilibrium in the competitive
environment. The graphs presents the quantities and prices of rights and output traded (L
and Q accordingly) between the rm and the community.
4. Discussion and Intuition of the Equilibrium Properties
The allocation of rights to the community decreased its willingness to pay for any ad-
ditional unit of right bought from the rm. That results in a shift down of the community's
demand curve for rights. Moreover, the allocation of rights has a positive income eect on
consumption of both environmental quality and output produced, and thus it will increase
the share of rights ex-post hold by the community and increase demand for output. The
community behavior will directly aect the rm's decision for production and abatement.
The rms are faced with higher demand for their product, and thus increase production. Side
by side, they are induced to abate more given the lower level of rights to pollute available to
them. The rm's aggregate costs of abatement and production increases, and so the price of
the output on the market. Nevertheless, both consumers and producers increase their gain
from trade. the environmental quality will increase due to a lower share of rights to pollute
used by the rms.
5. Policy Implications
The partial equilibrium model presented integrated the community's preferences into
an analysis of the eects of tradable pollution permits on prices, quantities and social welfare
and enables us to reassess the importance of the initial allocation of rights in the tradable
permit policy.
6We showed that even if markets are perfectly competitive, an increase in the share of
rights initially allocated to the community will decrease the level of rights that are held ex-
post by the rm and thus will increase environmental quality. The decrease in the share of
rights initially allocated to rms will not induce a reduction in quantity of output produced,
unless other factors, such as market power in the market of rights, are present. A reallocation
of rights may increase community welfare and have a positive income eect on the level
of output consumed. An additional important implication of the reallocation of rights to
communities is related to the potential adoption of new abatement technologies by the rms.
As the reallocation of rights to the communities may increase output produced and decrease
the level of rights used by the rms, the rms are facing higher incentives to lower abatement
costs by adopting advanced abatement technologies.
We did not discuss the eect of the reallocation of rights in cases where markets are
not perfectly competitive, although the analysis provided hints on the possibility that re-
allocation of rights to communities will aect the nal equilibrium in the related markets
and thus can be potentially used as a tool to correct for market failures which are due to
non-competitive behavior of the rms involved in the trade.
7Appendix
Proof. Proof of proposition 1. We establish each of the proposition's properties in turn.
(1) Denote by Ld and Ls the level of rights demanded and rights supplied. By construc-
tion,
L
d = Lc   c L; L
s = f  L   Lf:






























Thus a shift down of the demand curve will reduce the level of rights traded and
reduce prices.
(2) As dLc
dc > 0 and c + f = 1, it follows that
dLf
dc < 0 .
(3) As dLc
dc > 0 and Ep =  L Lc, it follows that the pollution level decreases, so environ-
mental quality is higher.
(4) An increase in the share of rights allocated to the community increased its income,
which led to an increase in the quantity of output it demanded.
dQc
dc > 0 (7). Given
the properties of output supply (12), an outward shift of the demand function in-
creases output and prices.
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Figure 1: Markets equilibrium in a competitive environment. (a): Equilibrium in rights 
market. (b): Equilibrium in output market. 
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